

11 SEP 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of CS Divisions and Staffs

SUBJECT : Security Approval Criteria for Contract Personnel
of the Clandestine Services

REFERENCE : Memo to DDP from Director of Security, dated
6 May 1968, same subject

1. I have approved the attached proposal of the Director of Security.

25X1A 2. The provisions of HR [REDACTED] will govern the security approvals of all persons who are to have staff-like access to official Agency installations or information.

3. No individual will continue to have such access without a favorable determination under HR [REDACTED]

4. All persons with such access who now hold only Contract Type B security approvals should be brought to my attention as soon as possible via Chief, CI Staff, so that they may be re-evaluated.

/s/ Thomas H. Karamessines

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

DD/P 8-1847

6 MAY 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Security Approval Criteria for Contract Personnel of the Clandestine Services

1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for your approval; such recommendation is contained in paragraph 8.

2. This Office has examined the criteria applied in the past to grant security approvals for the use of the various types of contract employees and the independent contractors for whom the Office of Security has approval responsibility. This has been done with due consideration to current Agency regulations and Clandestine Services Issuances together with the projected proposals of the new HR [REDACTED] and HNB [REDACTED]

3. This Office views the total group of contract personnel, from an approval criteria standpoint, as falling into three categories:

a. Those contract employees and independent contractors whose access to information, Agency staff personnel and official Agency installations is staff-like in character and whose security approvals, consequently, should be based on criteria identical to those used in granting clearances to staff personnel, namely, the criteria enumerated in HR [REDACTED]

b. Those contract employees and independent contractors whose access to information, Agency staff personnel and official Agency installations is not staff-like in character and whose security approvals, consequently need not necessarily be based on the same exacting criteria as those used in granting clearances for use of staff personnel;

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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c. The contract agents of the Clandestine Services whose Agency activities are primarily operational in character or are in support of operations and who, therefore, do not require security approvals, but rather operational approvals based, in part, on record and investigative information made available by the Office of Security.

4. A difficult category to adjudicate, from the Office of Security's standpoint, has always been that known in the past as the Type B contract employee and under the terminology of the new proposed HR [REDACTED] as the Type External contract employee. These cases have been particularly difficult when the employee's proposed utilization was intended to fall within the purview of the old and now discredited "exception" provision which permitted staff-like access to official installations and information. In a number of cases, the proposed Type B contract employee was a person whose foreign background defied full investigative scrutiny. Often it has not been derogatory information that made difficult or impossible the issuance of an approval but rather the inability to investigate in foreign areas to satisfy, within reasonable security limits, appropriate criteria elements. This has been particularly significant in appraising for [REDACTED] like positions where determination of "unquestioned [REDACTED], integrity, discretion, and trustworthiness" is deemed essential.

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5. It is our conviction that the handling of each approval request should begin by focusing on the access features of the candidate's intended utilization, with each case being assessed according to whether access is or is not intended to be staff-like. Working in an official Agency installation (Headquarters or a domestic or foreign station or base) would induce a categorization of the intended position as staff-like and this, in turn, would stimulate this Office to apply HR [REDACTED] in its analysis and ultimate approval decision. If, due to a lack of information or because of derogatory or questionable information it is impossible to determine that the Subject meets HR [REDACTED] standards, then the Subject would be disqualified for staff-like access and could not be approved for a staff-like status such as Type Internal contract employee (formerly Type A). In such a case, if approval were possible at all, it would have to be for a non-staff status such as Type External contract employee (formerly Type B) without staff-like access.

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6. It is felt that significant improvement in terminology could be realized if all requests for security approvals for the use of contract personnel by the Clandestine Services were responded to by this Office in one of three ways:

a. "Security Approved for Staff Access" (to be issued to Type Internal Contract employees, minority of Type Career contract employees, minority of independent contractors other than the contract agents of the Clandestine Services)

b. "Security Approved for Use Indicated... Not Staff Access" (to be issued to Type External contract employees, majority of Type Career contract employees, majority of independent contractors other than the contract agents of the Clandestine Services)

c. "Security Disapproved for Use Indicated"

7. It is believed that, with the adoption of the above terminology, the approval terms previously used for contract personnel, e.g. Type A Security Approval, Type B Security Approval, Covert Security Clearance, Covert Security Approval, etc. could well be discontinued. The responses listed in paragraphs 6 a, 6 b and 6 c above supplemented by added caveats, as necessary, seemingly subsume all of the reactions necessary for this Office to register on the contract personnel cases.

8. In the belief that they are consistent with the spirit of our November 1967 discussions and feeling that they further our mutually held goals, these recommendations are made:

a. HR [REDACTED] should be accepted as the standard for the security approval of the use of personnel who will have staff-like access to official Agency installations or information;

b. No occupant of official Agency installations nor any operative with staff-like access should be allowed to continue such access without a favorable determination under HR [REDACTED]

c. The cases of all personnel, located in official Agency installations, who hold Contract Type B Security Approvals should be brought to the attention of this Office so that they may be re-evaluated in terms of the above formulation.

or having
staff-like
access


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d. The nomenclature reforms outlined in paragraphs 6 and 7 above should be adopted.


Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

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The recommendation contained in paragraph 8 is hereby approved.


See memorandum of 15 July 1968
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

Date

Attachment

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